complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula."

There is nothing in this letter,—and it is a very long one,—to indicate that General McClellan thought that the army needed any further experience in camp to fit it for the field. He assumes throughout, that the troops are ready to move at once. There is no difference of opinion between him and the President as to the desirability and feasibility of an immediate movement of the army; the only question is as to the line of advance. General McClellan claims for his plan the recommendation of superior promptness of execution. "We can fix," he says, " no definite time for an advance" on Manassas. " The roads have gone from bad to worse. Nothing like their present condition was ever known here before ; they are impassable at present."[1] But a fleet, sufficiently large for the transportation of the army to the lower Chesapeake can be collected, he says, within thirty days from the time when the order is given ; and, the troops once landed, operations can be begun at once. " The roads in that region," he says, " are passable at all seasons of the year."[2]

The President was naturally very averse to this plan of General McClellan's. It involved necessa-

rily a serious risk; for the Army of the Potomac was to be transported from the neighborhood of Washington to the neighborhood of Richmond before the Confederate army had been even attacked, or its strength in any way impaired. That army

' s w. R.t 45.
s /£M 44, The **fact** was exactly the reverse.